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to 'be false is not coram nobis but habeas

PEOPLE v. ADAMSON.
Cr. 4989.

Supreme Court of California. in Bank.
Sept. 29, 1949.

Admiral Dewey Adamson was convicted of
mprder in the Superior Court, Los Angeles
County, Thomas L. Ambrose, J" and he ap·
pealed from an order denying his motion to
vacate in the nature of coram nobis.
The Supreme Court, Schauer, J" dismissed
the appeal holding that no grounds for relief
within the scope of the writ of coram nobis
were stated and that the petitioner failed to
present credible allegations of fact which
would constitute a prima facie case in any
form of proceeding,
Carter, J., dissented.
I. Criminal law

~997

Petition for coram nobis is in legal
effect a motion to vacate a judgment.
2. Criminal law

~997

~orpus.

6. Habeas corpus ¢:::;)29
Habeas corpus is proper proceeding to
raise question of systematic, discriminato.ry
exclusion of Negroes from grand jury.
7. Habeas corpus

~25(

I)

Habeas corpus can be us~d to advance
a defendant's contention of denial of right'
to counsel, at least where no other re~edy .
is available.
.
8. Criminal law

~991

' .

I

Where a defendant seeks to vac,ate a
solemn judgment of conviction, particularly'
one affirmed on appeal, ,s-howing of diligence essential to granting of relief by way
of Coram nobis should he no less th!:lll
similar showing required -in ,civi.1 Cases
where relief is sought against lately discovered fraud, and in such cases,' defendant·
must 'aver not only probative fads upon
which basic claim rests but also time and
circumstances under which facts 'were: discovered, and mere allegation of ultimate'
facts or of legal conclusion of diligenc~
is insufficient.

Purpose of "coram nobis" is to secure
relief, where no other remedy exists, from
a Judgment rendered while there existed
some fact which would have prevented its
rendition if trial court had known it and
which through no negligence or fault of 9. Criminal law ~991
defendant was not then known to the
Where defendant contended that state
court.
used perjured testimony to obtain mu~~er'
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
conviction and that method of se\ection
Edition, for other judicial constructions
of judges and jurors permitted' syste'matic
and definitions of "Coram Nobis",
exclusion of colored persons, and defendant
3. Criminal law ~997
did not exercise due diligence in advancil'l:g
Petition I for coram nobis must show contentions, no ground for relief was
that f~cts upon which petitioner relies were stated within scope of writ of: cor.;tm
:.lot known to him and could not in exercise nobis.
of due diligence have been discovered at 10. Criminal law ~997
any time substantially e'arIier than time of
Petition for coram nobis arlit support~ .
hi,S motion for writ, otherwise no ground ing affidavits failed to state sufficient credo. for relief is stated.
ible facts from which trial court and,
-4. Habeas corpus ~29
Habeas corpus is proper remedy to
attack collaterally a judgment of conviction
which ,has been obtained in violation of
fundamental constitutional rights.

Supreme Court would be iustified in believing that defendant had. some expect9-nce
of establishing his conc1usionary allegation~-;
of violations of due process of la:w. U.,S.C~
A.Const. Amend. 14.

5. Criminal law P991

II. Criminal law

~991

Coram nobis proceeding is a 'Court, Appropriate writ.ta'·secure relief from
a' judgment of conviction obtained -by usc made pi'oceeding, and, within 'liniits' of
-.of fal~<::, te~timony ,knowp, by . ~rosecut.ion .constitutional requirements, is su~j~ct to,
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such lirnit'ations ':ai1d procedural require.-

ments as creating court may prescribe.
12. Criminal law

be directed to proceed with execution of
its sentence in manner provided by law.

~997

Coram nobis proceeding is not subject
Morris Lavine, Los Angeles, for appelto all rules -applicable to an original trial
hut is an attack upon a judgment which lant.
has become final and in favor of which
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Walthere are strong presumptions of regularity, ter L. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General"
and petition is - regarded as a motion to William E. Simpson, District Attorney,.

vacate judgment arid not as a complaint Jere Sullivan .and Robert Wheeler, Deputy·
nor 'does it initi'ate an independent action. Attorneys General, Los Angeles, for re-·
spondent.
13. Criminal law ~997
Where state filed a demurrer to petiSCHAUER, Justice.
tion for a writ of coram nobis, Supreme
Court- would not accept as true allegations
There are before this court defendant's:
in petition but would consider circumstances appeal from a' judgment denying his petiin which those allegations were made and tion for coram nobis and th'e People's mostate's affidavits controverting them. Pen. tions -that Ij;his court dismiss such appeal,.
Code, § 1265.
vacate all orders staying execution of the
sentence,1 direct the trial court to proceed
i4. Criminal law ~997
in the manner provided by law with execuIn coram nobis proceeding, defendant
tion of its sentence (which imposes the'
failed ~o present credible allegations. of fact
death penalty), and direct immediate issuwhich would constitute a prima facie case
ance 'of the remittitur. For the reasons.
for rylief in any' form of ,proceeding.
hereinafter-stated, we have concluded that
the motions of the' People should be grant15. Criininallaw'~641(4)
Defendant's right to 'Counsel did not ed.
include right to postpone trial of a case
indefinit~ly and reject services of public

defender while defendant at his leisure

at'te~pted to find counsel who would serve

without charge and of whom defendant
and another person approved.
16. Criniinal law ¢:::;'304(1)

Supreme Court can take judicial notice
thaCit would 'be difficult to find in California any lawyers more experienced or 'better
qualified in defending criminals than public
defender of Los Angeles County and his
staff.
.
.
17. Criminal law

~IOOI.1131(4)

Where proceeding in nature of an
application for writ of coram nobis and
appeal therefrom had as their object nothing more 'than delay in execution of a
judgment, stay of execution previously
granted would be terminated, appeal from
judgment denying petitioner 'Coram nobis
would be dismissed, and trial court would

[!] By his petition for coram nobis.
(which is, in legal effect, a motion to vacate
a judgment [People v. Adamson (1949),33·
Ca1.2d 286, 287-288, 201 P.2d 537]) defendant attacks a' judgment of conviction of
first degree" murder which has been affirmed
by this court (People v. Adamson (1946),.
27 Ca1.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3; rehearing denied) and by the United States Supreme
Court (Adams011 v. California (1947), 33ZU.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171
A.L.R. 1223; rehearing denied, 332 U.S.
784, 68 S.C!. 27, 92 L.Ed. 367). He contends: That he was given only two days in~
which to prepare his defense and was thus
deprived of the right to effective aid of
counsel. That "there has been a constant
and systematic exclusion of colored persons.
in ·the appointment of judges" of the Los.
Angeles Superior Court, wherein ·he was.
convicted, thus denying to defendant, a
Negro, "due process of law and equal protection of the law." "That the mode and

I. Tho only presently existing order staying execution is an order of this court made May
4, 1949.

PEOPLE v. ADAMSON,
Cite as 210 P.2d 13

method of selection of jurors in Los
Angeles -County was such as to permit
systematic and persistent exclusion of members of the colored or African race on account of nlC0 * * *, and that the jury
commissioner called only white persons to
attend the trial and try Admiral Dewey
Adamson * * *,
and that the jury
selected to try your petitioner consisted entirely of women, all white. That such proccdure and proceedings denied 'him the
equal protection of the law and due process
of law." That defendant was convicted
upon false testimony of fingerprint experts
and of Mrs. Frances Turner, used hy the
State with knowledge of its f,alsity.
The judgment attacked on the above
g,rouncis was rendered on November 27,
1944. It was affirmed on appeal On January
4, 1946 (People v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal.
2d 478, 165 P.2cl 3); a petition for reheari1lg was denied on January 31, 1946; and
defendant was resentenced by the trial
court on February 15, 1946. On June 23,
1947, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of this court (Adamson v.' California, supra, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.
Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223),
and on October 13, 1947, that court denied
a petition for rehearing, 332 U;S. 784, 68
S.Ct. 27, 92 L.Ed. 367. On November 18,
1947, ,the trial court set February 6, 1948,
as the date for defendant's execution. On
January 30, 1948, just one week before the
dtlte set for his execution, defendant peti-,
tion~d this court for the writ _of h,,,beas
corpus. The petition .was denied. The.
United S.tates Supreme Court denied certiorari to this court (Adamson v. California
(February 5, 1948),333 U.S. 831, 68 S.C!.
610, 92 L.Ed. 1115). Thereafter (later in
the day on February 5, 1948), a judge of
the United States District Conrt granted a
stay of execution to permit consideration of
a petition for habeas corpus in that court.
On February 16, 1948, the district judge
denied the petition for habeas corpus and
on March 2, 1948, he refused a certificate
of probable cause for appeal. On Mar-ch
29, 1948, the trial COl\ft again fixed a date
for execution: June 4, 1948. Thereafter
a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied dofcml-

GaL
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ant's application for certificate of prdbable
cause for an appeal from the District Court
order (Ex parte Adamson (May 11, 1948),
167 F.2d 996). The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari to the Court of Appeals (Ex porte Adamson (June 1, 1948),
334 U.S. 834, 68 S.Ct. 1342, 92 L.Ed. 1761).
On J nne 2, 1948, defendant filed his petition for coram nobis in the trial court and
that court ordered execution srtayed ar:d
issued its order to show cause why the
petition should not be granted. The People
then filed a "Motion for a Denial of the
Relief Prayed For" with affidavits denying
generally and controverting specifically the
material allcgations of the petition, and also a "Demurrer." On July 12, 1948, the
trial 'comt made its order that "Demurrer
to petition * * * is sustained without
leave to amend." Defendant attempted to
appeal from this non~appca1ab1e order (see
People v. Adamson (1949), supra, 33 Cal.
2d 286, 201 P.2d 537). After dismissal of
this purported appeal the trial court, on
February 15, 1949, heard argument and
rendered the 'IIJ udgment Denying Petition
for Writ of Error Coram Nabis" from
which the present appeal is taken, and se,t
May 6, 1949, as the date of execution. On
April 25, ~949, defendant file4 with this
court an application for stay of judgment
pending appeal' and, some of the,' justices
beillg of the view that defendant :ha-d shown
probable cause for reversal, on May' '4, 1949,
we grante~l d~fenda.nt's a'pplication 'for stay
of execution. Aft~r further ·c'o'nsidctation
we are satisfied' thh.t the appeal- ·ls' devoid
of merit.
The Failure to State any Ground for Relief within the Scope of the Writ of
Coram Nobis.
[2,3] In this ·st.at.e a motion to vacate
a judgtmcnt in the nature of a petition for
coram nobis is a remedy ,0,£ narrow scope.
(See People v. Darcy (1947), 79 CaLApp.
2d 683, 693, 180 P.2d 752; People v. Martinez (1948), 88 CaLApp.2d 767, 774, 199
P.2d 375.) Its purpose is to SeCU1"e relief,
where no other remedy exists, from a
judgment rendered. while there existed
some fact which .""ould have prev~nted its
rendition if the trial cour~ had known it
and which, through no negligence, or fault

16
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of the defendant, was not then known to

the court. (People v. Gilbert (1944), .Z5
Ca1.2d 42Z, 44Z, 154 P.Zd 657; In re Lindley (1947),29 Cal.2d 709, 725·726, 177 P.2d
918; People v. Tuthill (1948), 32 Ca1.Zd
819, 821, 198 P.2d 505.) The applicant for
the writ "must show that the facts upon
which he relies Wefe not known to him and
could not in the exercise of due diligence
have been discovered by ,him at any time
substantially earlier than the time of his
motion for the writ; otherwise he has
stated no ground for relief." (People v.

Shorts (1948), 32 Ca1.2d 50Z, 513, 197 P.2d
330, 336.)
[4--7] With expansion of the function
of habeas corpus in this state, an application for that writ has become the proper
remedy to attack collaterally a judgment of

[proceeds directly to consideration of the
merits of the contention, without discussing
whether the writ is a proper remedy]; In

re Tedford (1948), 31 Cal.Zd 693, 192
P.2d 3 [same]; Inre McCoy (1948), 32
Ca1.2d 73, 76, 194 P.2d 531 [habeas corpus
is available where petitioner has no other
adequate remedy]; see also In re Connor

(1940), 16 Ca1.Zd 701, 705, 108 P.2d 10, 13
[llUnder the general rule well established in
this state, but which admits of some modification under exceptional circumstances,
this contention cannot at this late date be
made the basis of a successful collateral attack by habeas corpus upon the validity of
the judgment"; the contention could have
been raised by direct appeal or by a nonstatutory motion to vacate the judgment].)
Defendant's application for the writ of

conviction which has been obtained in vio- coram nobis ignores the above summarized
lation of fundamental constitutional rights.
Thus, the appropriate writ to secure relief
from a judgment of conviction obtained
by the use of false testimony known by the
prosecution to be false is not coram nobis
but habeas corpus (In re Lindley, supra,

page 725 of 29 Cal.2d, page 928 of 177 P.2d;
see People v. Mooney (1918), 178 Cal. 525,
174 P. 325; Mooney v. Holohan (1934),
294 U.S. 103, 113, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed.
791, 98 A.L.R. 406; In re Mooney (1937),
10 Ca!.2d 1, 73 P.2d 554), although coram
nobis has been used for' this purpose (see

People v. Kirk (1946), 76 Ca1.App.2d 496,
498, 173 P.Zd 367). And habeas corpus, not
a nonstatutory motion to vacate the judg~
ment (in the nature of a petition for coram
nobis), is the proper proceeding to raise
the question of systematic, discriminatory
exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury

which indicted defendant, a Negro. (See
People v. Montgomery (194Z), 51 Ca1.App.
2d 444, 125 P.2d 108.) Habeas corpus can
be used to advance th-e contention of denial
of the right to counsel, at least where no

other remedy is available. (See In re Egan
(1944), 24 Ca1.Zd 323, 337, 149 P.2d 693,
701 ["It may be assumed that a petitioner
would be entitled to release on habeas corptis" if he could show that deprivation of
counsel" resulted in an unfair trial or in
substance' in "no trial at all"]; In reO Jingles

holdings as to the respective functions of
that writ and of habeas corpus. Apparently defendant formerly recognized that
in this state habeas corpus rather than
coram nobis is the appropriate proceeding
in which to raise the questions whether he
was deprived of the right to counsel and
whether there was discrimination against
Negroes in the selection of judges and trial
jurors in Los Angeles County, for he advanced these contentions in his petitions
for habeas corpus addressed to this court
and to the United States District Court.
Defendant now repeats these contentions
without suggesting any reason why he
should be permitted to reiterate the same
coIIateral attacks upon the judgment in
various proceedings. Furthermore, he does
not even attempt to make the showing
fundamentaIly necessary for issuance of
the writ of coram nobis j he does not suggest that he was diligent in advancing these
contentions. The facts as to the asserted
deprivation of the effective aid of counsel
and the asserted discriminatory exclusion
of Negroes from bench and jury either
were known to defendant or in the exercise
of ordinary diligence should have been

known to him (at least through his counsel)

at the time of trial and defendant does not
attempt to show that such facts were not
known to the trial court, nor does he ex(1946),27 Ca1.2d496, 498, 165 P.2d 12 plain his failure to raise them in orderly

PEOPLE v. ADAMSON
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fashion on appeal from the judgment of States Supreme Court (as appellate courts
conviction.
must do on appeal) gave credence to this
[8] As to his contcntion that the evidence which .tends to support the judgState knowingly used perjured testimony, mcnt of conviction.
not only docs defendant present it in this
inappropriate proceeding, but he does not The FaIlure to Present Credible Allegacomply with the requirement that he show
tions of Fact which Would Constitute
that he ·has exercised due diligence.
a Prima Facie Case in any Form of
H[W]here a defendant seeks to vacate a
Proceeding.
solemn judgment of conviction, particularly
[9-13] The petition for coram nobis
where such judgment has been affirmed on
appeal, the showing of diligence essential to and supporting affidavits not only state a
the granting of relief by way of Coram case wholly outside the tenable scope of
nobis should be no less than the similar the writ j they also fail to state sufficient
showing required in civil cases where relief credible facts from which the trial court
is sought against lately discovered fraud. (and this court) would be justified in beIn such cases it is necessary to aver not lieving that defendant had some expectance
only the probative facts upon which the of establishing his conclusionary allegabasic claim rests, but also the time and cir- tions of violations of due process of Jaw.
cumstances under which the facts were dis- The proceeding designated "coram nobis"
covered, in order that the court can deter- in this state is a court-made proceeding
mine as a matter of law whether the liti- and, within the limits of the constitutional
gant proceeded with due diligence; a mere requirements pointed out in People v.
allegation of the ultimate facts Or of the Shorts (1948), supra, 32 Ca1.2d 502, 506,
legal conclusion of diligence, is insuffi- 197 P.2d 330, must, therefore, be subject to
cient." (People v. Shorts (1948), supra, such limita,tions· and procedural require32 Ca1.2d 502, 513, 197 P.2d 330, 337.) ments as the creating court may prescribe.
Defendant does not even mention the time Such proceeding is not subject to all the
and circumstances under which the asserted rules applicable to an original trial; it is
falsity of the fingerprint evidence was dis- an attack upon a judgment which has becovered. Nor does he mention in his peti- come final and in favor of which there are
tion or supporting affidavits the time and strong presumptions of regularity; the
circumstances of his asserted discovery that "petition" is regarded as a motion to vacate
the prosecution used Mrs. Turner's testi- the judgment j it is not a complaint nor
mony with knowledge that it was false. docs it initiate an independent action (In n:
His first and only attempt to make this Paiva (1948), 31 Ca1.2d 503, 509, 190 P.2d
essential explanation was before this court 604). The facts that the People filed inter
when he applied for a stay of execution. alia a document entitled "Demurrer" and
At that time he made the following vague that the trial court made an order (superaverment: "The perjury involved par- seded by the order now appealed from)
is sustained
ticularly the testimony of Frances Jean that the "Demurrer * *
without
leave
to
amend"
did
not require
Turner, a white woman, and was bas'ed
the
trial
court
<'.nd
do
not
require
this court
upon an investigation made by a detective
employed by friends of the accused, as to accept every allegation of the petition
her testimony weighed not only with this and supporting affidavits at face value.
Court, but the United States Supreme The trial court considered, and we are enCourt in its consideration of the suffi- titled to consider, the circumstances in
ciency of the testimony." If Mrs. Turner's which those allegations were made and
testimony was false, this fact was known to the People's affidavits controverting them.
defendant at the time she testified, and he
In the circumstances of the present case
cannot be excused for his failure to raise -a coram nobis attack upon a judgment
the question of its falsity until after he which has become final after affirmance on
discovered that this court and the United appeal-we hold that this court, like the

*

210 P.2d-%
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trial court, has ((every right and the plain
duty to scrutinize [defendant's claims] with
a critical eye, in the light of its familiarity
with the facts of this crime as they had
been adduced in [the trial]." (Hysler v.
Florida (1941), 315 U.S. 411, 417, 316 U.S.
642,62 S.Ct. 688, 692, 86 L.Ed. 932.) This
rule is the same whether the proceeding be
before us on appeal or -on direct application. (See Pen.Code, § 1265.) The Hysler
case concerns the Florida procedure whereby convicted defendants can, even after
affirmance of the j uclgment on appeal, obtain relief of the sort sought here; 1. e.,
"the judicial correction of a wrong committed in the administration of criminal jus
tice and resulting in the deprivation of life
or liberty without due process" (page 415
of 315 U.S., page 691 of 62 S.Ct.). "The
state's security In the just administration
of its criminal law must largely rest upon
the competence of its trial courts. But
that does not bar the state Supreme Court
from exercising the vigilanc;e of a hardheaded consideration of appeals' to it for
upsetting a conviction" (i)age 422 of 315
U.S., page 694 of 62 S.Ct.). And in giving
such consideration we, like the'trial court,
are- "not bound to accept at face. value
the aHegations of ,the petition" (Taylor·
v. Alabama (1948), 335 U.S. 252, 262,
68 S.Ct. 1415, 1420, 92 L.Ed; 1935).
w

[14] Before discussing separately the
specific -contentions of defendant we note
the fO,Howing matters whic,h bear upon the
sinGerity of the whole. <?f ,his petition: He
alJeges, "I desire to testify at the hc<:tring
on my petition for writ O,£. er.ror coram
nobis,: or any other appropriate writ, for
which ,this application is being considered,
on the grounds that my rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the ,Constitution
of the United States have been violated,
and request that the court enter an order
for my appearance at said hearing, or otherwise grant an opportunity so that my
deposition might be taken." At his trial
defendant chose not to testify before the
jury. He' was, to be sure, then confronted
with a difficult choice: whether to take
the stand and have prior convictions of
felony disclosed to the jury, ~r to fail to.

explain or deny the evide.llce .against him
an have such failure commented .upon by
the prosecuting attorney and the trial court
(see discussions of this problem, People v.
Adamson (1946), supra, 27 Ca1.2d 478, 494,
165 P.2d 3; Adamson v. California (1947),
supra, 332 U.S. 46, 57, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91
L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223). But we are
justified in considering that defendant's
belated desire to take the stand (not, it
should be noted, before a jury, but only
before a judge) is not becaus~ of any belief that he can give testimony relevant to
the asserted deprivations of constitutional
rights (the allegations of his petition and
af.6davit show that he can give very little
testimony in this connection) but only to
secure further delay.
We are justified also in considering that
defendant, after having, set forth in his
petition all the contentions abo~e stated
(210 P.2d 14), has on this appeal seen fit
to confine his argument to one contention:
that his allegations as to the .falsity of Mrs.
Turner's testimony required th~t the question of fact be tri.ed out. Yet' examination
of the record of the trial discloses that, of
all the matters complained of .in his peti-'
6-on, the testimony of Mrs. Turner is by,
far the least important. Furtherrnor,e we
note that defendant is under sentence for
four burglaries unconnected hi,' their commIssion with the murder here under' consic;leralion, and that such, four convicti~!ls.
rest upon fingerprint evidence. of precisely
th~ same character as that question~d here
and were obtained before the sam~ judge
and the verdicts were r:endered by" a jury'
selected in the same manner as in the mur~
der case. Defendant is ~i~o under se'nten~e
for a burglary connected in its ~ommission
with the lllnrder; the verdict of gul1ty' of.
that burglary re'sts upon precisely the same
the same
evidence and was rendered
trial as the verdict of guilty of murder.
Yet it is only the conviction of murder,
carrying with it the death pen~1ty, which
defenda'nt has questioned. We, are entitled
to question the sincerity of contentions directed only to the judgment which would
deprive defendant of life and not, as they
could be, to those judgments which depriVe!
J?im of liberty.

in,
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We note, also, the lengthy history of attacks upon the judgment of death (210 P.
2d 15) and the fact that at all times since
defendant went to trial on the murder
charge he has been represented by experienced and devoted counsel of his selection.
In these circumstances we cannot accept
his allegations that he is "poor" and "ignorant" as an excuse for his failure to present a convincing factual showing in su11port of his conc1usionary allegations of
want of due process.
Deprivation of Effective Aid
of Counsel.
As to this contention the records on appeal from the judgment of conviction and
th~ . judgment denying the petition for
coram nobis show the following:
Defendant was arrested on August 24,
1944. A few days later, according to a
police officer, defendant said, uWhen the
time comes I will have my witnesses there
to prove [an alibi defense], and I will be
defended by one of the best attorneys in
Los Angeles"; on August 28 and August
31 defendant made similar statcments to
the officer.
[15, 16] At the preliminary hearing defendant was represcnted by Mr. Ward
Sulliva'n. The information was filed September 14, 1944. On September 18, 1944,
defendant appeared for arraignment without counsel; the public defender was appointed to represent him and trial was set
for November 9,1944. On October 3, 1944,
the public defender was allowed to withdraw as counsel for defendant. Defendant has not attempted to explain why Mr.
Sullivan withdrew from the case; we can~
not assume that he withdrew in violation
of his duty and against defendant's wishes.
The only attempt to explain why the public
defender withdrew from the Case appears
in an affidavit of Mr. Milton Safier, who
represented defendant at the trial. Mr.
Safier avers' that defendant "informed me
that the court * * * without his wishes
o'r consent, 'appointed a Deputy Public Dc~
fender to represent him but that the Deputy
PU'blic Defender; named Richard Bird, was
not an attorney of his choice j that he knew
~othing about Richard Bird's ability j that

Cat.
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Richard Bird was unsatisfactory ,to him
• • • That he wanted counsel of his
own choice and counsel chosen by Loyd
Wright, * * * with his approval and
consent." Of course defendant's right to
counsel does not include the right
postpone the trial of a case indefinitely and
reject the services of the public defender
while defendant, at his leisure, attempts to
find counsel who will serve without charge
and of whom defendant and Mr. 'Wright
approve. (Sce People v. Manchetti (1946),
29 Cal.2d 452, 458, 175 P.2d 533, and cases
there cited.) This court can take judicial
notice, too, that it would be difficult to find
in California any lawyers more exp'crienced
or better qualified in defending criminal
cases than the public defender of Los Angeles County and his staff.
Mr. Safier, an associate of Mr. Morris
Lavine, undertook to represent' ddendant
on November 6, 1944, pursuant t(dl request
of Mr~ Wright made to Mr., Lavine. On
November 6 Mr. Safier requested and was
refused a continuance. Four charges' of
burglaries unrelated to the murder went
to trial on November 9, 1944j on 'this trial
defenda'nt was represented by both the public defcnder and Mr. Safier. On November 14, when the trial of these four charges
ended, the trial for murder and the burglary connected therewith commenced' "at
once, with Mr. Safier representing defendant. Defendant did not testify and produced no witnesses.
Defcndant alleges that he gave Mr.
Safier Hthe namcs of eleven persons whose
testimony he said was vital, some of whose
addresses he fU'rnished and others whose
addresses he could not furnish, most of
which witnesses Adamson said could establish an alibi defense," but there was insufficient time for Mr. Safier to locate and
interview these witnesses. However, defendant has not seen fit <to identify these
witnesses or to suggest what their testimany would be, other than allcging that
at about the time the murder was being
committed he was with his brother and
mother and tl,ereafter he "talked with Mrs.
Robbie Babinean." In this proceeding we
need not be so credulous as to believe that.
because Mr. Safier did not have more time

to'
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to prepare a defense, defendant coulc;l not the court appointed Harry Rogers of the
produce his mother and brother as wit- sheriff's office. Mr. Rogers compared fi'nnesses.
gerprints found in deceased's apartment
with defendant's prints, came to the conAsserted Systematic Exclusion of Negroes clusion that the prints found in the apartfrom the Los Angeles Superior Court
ment were those of defendant, -and so testiBench and Jury Panel.
fied at the trial.
The petition contains no suggestion of
On argument in the trial cou'rt as to the
the manner in which defendant hoped to petition for coram nobis defendant proprove these allegations. When they were duced as a witness the above mentioned
presented to the trial judge on argument Mr. Allen. Mr. Allen was permitted to
as to 1he petition, he stated, t41 don't <be- take the stand rather than to give a suplieve you can prove anything of that sort." porting affidavit. He testified that he had
We are justified in concluding that defend- not been act'ive in fingerprint work for
ant's counsel agreed with this statement, 19 years and did not believe that he could
for he made no attempt in the trial COUJ."It qualify as an expert. Therefore, he was
and has made no attempt in this court to. not allowed to give any evidence as to the
show that he 'has any expectance of estab- comparison of the prints. (The averments
lishing the allegations.
as to the falsity of the fingerprint evidence are contradicted by affidavits, filed in
The Fingerprint Evidence.
opposition to the petition for coram nobis,
Defendant has not suggested that he can of the deputy district attorney who proseproduce any evidentiary facts to support cuted defendant, the fingerprint expert who
the alleged conclusion that the fingerprint testified for the People, the court appointed
evidence was false and that the People fingerprint expert, the two police officers
knew of its falsity. Shortly after the be- who investigated the homicide, the officer
ginning of testimony on the rna-rning of the who originally found and photographed
murder trial, the prosecuting attorney said the fingerprints in deceased's apartment,
.t hat "when we tried the other case against and the officer who first entered deceased's
this defendant [the four burglary charges apartment aiter the killing.)
110t connected in their commission with .j;he
The fingerprints identified as defendant's
<offenses now under consideration]. it in- at the trial were there described by the
volved finger print testimony * • * and experts as "latent." In his affidavit decounsel, in commenting to the jury, in that fendant avers upon information and belief
,case, mentioned the fact that finger print that lila tent finger prints, unlike other
{'xperts were expensive"; that the same types of finger prints, are inaccurate and
fingerprint expert would testify for the subject to' many combinations and discrepPeople in the present case. The prosecut- a.ndes and. ,falsehoods; that these facts
lng attorney requested and the trial court were known to the State." "Latent" prints,
agreed that the court appoint as its own accordipg to the expert testimony at the
witness some expert who had had no con- trial (and this defendant does not quesnection with the case. The judge stateq tion), are simply prints left when the
that he would appoint any qualified expert finger, slightly oily and damp with ordinwhom defendant's counsel sU'ggested. De- ary body secretions, toU"ches a reasonably
fendant's counsel suggested Mr. Chester clean, s!11ooth surface, 1. e., the type of
Allen. The judge replied that he knew prints which constitute an essential part
Mr. A11en and did not wish to appoint him of the basis for virtually all fingerprint
because he had not been in, fingerprint identification insofar- as connecting a dework for some 20 years. Appointment 'of fendant with a particular crime is conthe court's witness was postponed ·to give cerned. In the absence of any sugge,stion
defendant's counsel an opportunity to find of evidentiary facts to that effect, we need
a qualified expert. He was apparently un- not -believe that defendant has discovered
able to find one satisfactory to him, and ev~<;le~ce tendiJ?g to show th~t practica11y
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all expert testimony as to such fingerprint whereupon the man from the District Atidentification is false or mistaken or un- ,to'mey's office told her not to mention
reliable.
anything about dates." After defendant's
conviction Mrs. Turner told Gaines "that
The Testimony of Mrs. Turner.
at the time she gave her testimony in the
Although, as stated above, this is the case she thought she was testifyng for
only point which defendant has argued to Dewey and testified exactly to what she
this court, his petition minimizes its im- had been told to say." (In 'Opposition to
portance by averring that "defendant was the petition for coram nobis the People
convicted principally, if not solely, upon filed an affidavit of Mrs. Turner that her
testimony "was true at the time it was
[the finger print] evidence."
The murder was committed and de- given at said trial and is now true."J
ceased's diamond rings disappeared about
At the time of argument on the petition
July 25, 1944. The witness Turner testi- ' Mrs. Turner, who had been subpren;red by
fied that at a time between the 10th and Mr. Lavine, was present in the court room.
the 14th of August, 1944, she overheard However, since the trial court concluded
defendant ask an unidentified man in a that the. petition and supporting affidavits
bar whether he would like to buy a dia- did not require the trying out of issu'es of
mond ring. In his affidavit defendant fact, he did not permit defendant to call
aVers on information and belief that Mrs. Mrs. Turner to the stand. Independently
Turner's husband was "WIder investigation reappraising the credibility and effect of
for theft" and that she. agreed to testify the Gaines affidavit in, the light of all the
as the People wished in return for a facts before us, we conclude that such affipromise that her husband would not he davit does not sufficiently show a deprivaprosecuted. An affidavit of Mr. Harold tion of due proce'ss. Defendant has not
Gaines contains the only direct allegations attempted to explain why, although he
of evidentiary facts tending to support de- must have known that Mrs. Turner's testifendant's assertion that the People know- mony was false (if it was false) at the
ingly used false testimony. Such allega- time it was given, he did not raise this
tions are: About two days ·before Mrs. poi~t until, nearly three years and nine
Turner testified at the trial of Adamson, months after he was convicted, he filed hi,
Gaines saw her at a bar with a man un- petition for coram nobis. We are not inknown to Gaines. Thereafter, Mrs. Tur- formed who Mr. Gaines is or why year3
ner told Gaines that the man was "the elapsed between the trial and the makin~
District Attorney" and that "she did not of his affidavit. The averments of the
know Why the District Attorney wanted Gaines affidavit do not support the asser·
her to testify in Dewey's case, because she tion, found only in the affidavit of defend·
didn't know anything about it." The next ant and only upon information an4 belief,
morning, while Gaines was at Mrs. Tur- that Mrs. TUrner gave false testimony in
ner's home, a man arrived and said that return for a promise by an unidentified
"he wanted her to go down town with him officer of the State that her husband would
to the District Attorney's office." Mrs. not be prosecuted for theft. In striking
Turner left with this man. She returned contrast 10 the lack of allegations c.oncernwith the same man and told Gaines -that ing the discovery of the relevant facts
in the district attorney's office she had been averred in the Gaines affidavit, are defendshown "some horrible pictures of a de- ant's detailed, lengthy allegations as to
ceased woman * * *; that they told other matters, some unimportant, some inher that was what they had Dewey for." competent, and practically all known to deShe asked Gaines Hwhat date it was that fendant at the time of his trial, concerning
Dewey 'wanted to sell Tim the rings." Mrs. Turner and her testimony. 'Defend~.
Gaines replied that he had not been present. ant devotes a large portion of his petition·
on any such occasion. "Then Frances Jean and affidavit to describing a causa," sociai ,
Turner said perhaps she was mistaken, meeting of Mrs. Turner and defendan.,
Cal.Rep. 209..210 P,2d--31
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which took place after the murder and be- solve to delay execution of judgment rather
fore defendant's arrest and which has no than a sincere attempt to presellt 'a serious·
The petition question of fact and law.
and supporting affidavits contain a number
Upon the showing made to us nearly five
of 'al1e'gations such as the {allowing: De- years after the judgment of con,:,iction was
fendant's counsel avers on information and rendered, we conclude that 'lit is asking
belief that after defendant's conviction an entirely too much of the court to believe'"
unidentified person interviewed, by tele- the allegations of the petition and support-.
phone, one Dauzat, owner of the bar where, jng affidavits (see Taylor v. Alabama
according to Mrs. 'Turner's testimony, she (1947), supra, 335 U.S. 252, 271, 68 S.Ct.
overheard defendant's conversation regard- 1415, 1424; 92 L.Ed. 1935); we can only
ing rings, and Dauzat "inferred to the in- believe that this proceeding in the nature
terviewer that this woman was not a per- of an application for coram nobis and the
son of reputable character~ He also stated appeal therefrom have had as their object
that petitioner Adamson frequently came
nothing more than delay in the execution
into the place and was not a drinking man, of the judgment under attack.
preferring coca-cola, and that he never
[17] For the reasons above stated, the
knew Adamson to be other than a perfect
gentleman; that throughout 'his experience stay of execution heretofore granted is
in this type of business he found that when terminated, the appeal from the judgment
a party wanted to make some kind of a denying the petition for coram ,nobis is dis~
deal he would not discuss it at the bar, missed, and the trial court is directed to
where talk could be overheard, he would proceed with execution of its sentence in
do so· in a pr'ivate conversation, and that the manner provided by law. (See People
from his assodation with petitioner Adam~ v. Shorts (1948), supra, 32 Cal.2d 502, 518,
son and his observation of Adamson while 197 P.2d 330.) Let the remittitur issue
in the establishment, he was of the opinion forthwith.
that Adamson would not think of discussing any business at the bar. He further
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, TRAYstated that he does not believe that Frances NOR, and SPENCE, JJ., concur.
Turner ever "heard Adamson in this diamond ring conversation, but thinks that she
EDMONDS, Justice.
testified as she did because she wanted
I concur in the judgment solely upon
to dear herself from any association with the ground that relief by coram nobis was
colored men." Harold Gaines avers in his properly denied because habeas 'corpus is
affidavit that "During all of the time I the availflb.le and proper remedy. The
have known Frances Jean Turner I have courts developed the modern use of the
known her to be a steady drinker and a writ of error coram nobis in an era when
confirmed drunkard and a person who it furni·shed the only remedy for reviewing
sought the limelight." Defendant avers in certain serious errors. However, in rehis affidavit that Mrs. Turner "was a white cent years, generally, sp'eaking, habeas cor~
woman who had been out with Dewey pus has been made available for the corAdamson, had visited his home and that rection of errors withi~ the category of
she had - had drinks with the said Dewey lack of procedural due process of law. In
Adamson." These and similar averments, re McCoy, 32 CaJ.2d 73, 194 P.2d 531; In
incompetent to establish defendant's con- re Jingles, 27 Cal.2d 496, 165 P.2d 12; In
tention that Mrs. Turner perjured herself, re Mooney, 10 CaJ.2d 1, 73 P.2d 554. Acare relevant to a determination of the sin- cordingly, the compelling necessity for the
cerity with which that contention is ad- use of a writ of error coram nobis is no
vanced. By seeking to buttress ·a conten- longer present. Moreover, the enlarged
tion of deprivation of due process with al- use of habeas corpus avoids the necessity
legations such as those last quoted, defend~ for the time consuming practice of making
ant and his counsel indicate a desperate re~ an application for relief in the trial court

connection with the crime.
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followed by an appeal from an adverse determination. 1 See People v. Nixon and
Murphey, Cal.Sup., 209 P.2d 385; People
v. Shorts, 32 Ca1.2d 502, 197 P.2d 330.
The effect of the present decision is to
foreclose in the future most, if not all, of
the present uses of the writ of error coram
nobis, for there are no signifIcant situations where that writ might be used in
which habeas corpus is not now available.
This result reflects sound policy directed to
protection of the rights of persons improperly convicted, and at the same time
expedites the efficient administration of
justice.
I do not agree with the protracted discussion in the majority opinion as to the
procedure for obtaining coram nobis and
the nature of the proceeding. (See dissent, In re Paiva, 31 Cal.2d 503, at page
511, 190 P.2d 604.) The opinion holds
that "vVith the expansiqn of the function
of habeas corpus in this state, an application for that writ has become the proper
remedy to attack collaterally a judgment
of conviction which has been obtained in
violation of fundamental constitutional
rights." By that rule, the modern use of
the writ of error coram nobis is judicially
{(repealed" and it is entirely urinecessary
to discuss rules of pleading applicable to
proceeding which it is said may not be
maintained. If consideration of those principles were proper, I would state my reasons for disagreeing with much .o.£. what is
stated.

a
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the petition and affidavits of petitioner.
But in addition to the foregoing, I do not
believe it is the function of this Court to
pass upon the credibility and Hsincedty" of
petitioner's pleadings. Likewise, the trial
ct;mrt should not do so in ruling on a demurrer.
This Com-t is merely reviewing the action of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer interposed by the People. In so
doing it must give full weight to the trial
court's determination the same as in any
other case. The majority opinion gives no
reason and cites no authority for the
unique proposition that a different rule applies to the pleadings in a coram nobis proceeding than that appiicable to pleadings
in other proceedings. The majority opinion is replete with statements that the allegations cannot be believed, that they are
not sincere, that they are mere conclusions
and the like. On demurrer all the pleaded
facts must be taken as true-:-must be believed. That is especially true where the
demurrer is general. Moreover, they must
be liberally construed. Hudsot) v .. Craft,
33 Ca1.2d 654, 204 P.2d 1.' Certainly when
a man's life is in the balance and constitutional issues are raised, tlIe, rule of liberal construction is eveD' ,mo'r~' il~perative
than in the ordina~y case:' It is said in
People v. Long, 34<i Ill. 64<i, 178'N.E. 918,
919: "The facts ,set out were S,llmFiently
definite to raise the issue of :whettler the
plea of guilty was entered ,through an excusable mistake or igl'lOrahce of the, accused, and whether he was deprived of ,a
substantial defense which he might have
urged on his trial. Under such circumstances, the trial court could not arbitrarily refuse a full hearing upon the petition. The allegations 6f a petition 'need
be only prima facie sufficient for th'e' granting of such a hearing." See also, Howie
v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158, 10 A.
L.R. 205.

CARTER, Justice.
I dissent.
While it may be true that defendant has
failed to allege sufficient facts to show due
diligence-why he .did ,not discover SOoner
the basis for his atta~k on .the judgment
<lnd proceed accordingly, yet the demurrer
to his petition should not have been sustained without leave to amend. He may
If the facts stated in the petition and afbe able to al1ege facts .which would show
diligence and should be given the oppor- fidavits, taken at their face value, are intunity to do so. Those co'mments are also sufficient as a matter of law to constitute
applicable to the other allcged defects in a g-round or basis for relief, the demurrer
I. The .1949 amendment to section 1265
of the Penal Oode hfts avoiul,ld some of

the present procedural steps.
1049, Ch. 1309 [A.B. 25751.)

(Stats.
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should have been sustained, and, in the absence of an amendment setting forth fur~
ther facts, that should be· the end of the
story. The discussion in the majority
opinion relative to the good faith and sin~
cerity of petitioner and his counsel in making the statements contained in the petition and affidavits, goes entire1y beyond the
scope of the review which this Court is
called upon to make in deciding the issue
presented by this appeal.
I would reverse the judgment and direct
the trial court to permit petitioner to
amend his petition if he be so advised.
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H<lWARD GREER CUSTOM ORIGINALS
v. CAPRITTI et al.

Clv. 17036.
DIRtrict Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division I, CalifornIa.
Oct. 3, 1049.

Rebearlng Granted Nov. 1, 1949.
See 213 P.2d 78.
Howard Greer Custom Originals, sued J.
C. Otprlttl, doing business under the fictitious firm name and style of Rose MarIe of
CalifPlrnia, and other fictitious defendants,
and Rose Marie of California, Inc., sued as
Black and White Company, for claim and
delivery, conversion and damages for breach
of contrac~ wherein a cross-complaint was
filed by the corporate defendant.
A default judgment was entered against
the defendant, .1. C. Capritti, and its motion
to set aside the default was denied by the
Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Stanley N. Barnes, J., and 'such defendant alone appealed.
'..rhe District Court of Appeal, Drapeau,
J., affh'med the order on gl'ound that defendant -had fniled to, prove any of the
grounds provided for under statute which
would enable trial court to grant' relief requested.
I. Appeal and error ~113(1)
An order denying motion under stat-

ute to set aside judgment as taken through

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, is appealable. Code Civ.Proc.
§ 473.
2. Judgment ¢::::>139

In considering motions to set aside defaults, trial court must exercise a sound
and legal discretion in such matter as to
serve and not defeat or impede ends of
substantial justice. Code Civ.Proc. § 473.
3. Judgment ¢::::>363

The statute authorizing court to relieve
party from judgment taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, is remedial and
should be liberally construed so as to dispose of cases on their substantive merits
and give party claiming meritorious right
in good faith opportunity to present it.
Code Civ.Proc. § 473.
4. Appeal and error ¢::::>982(2)

Reviewing courts will scan more closely and are more prone to reverse orders
denying relief from judgments on ground
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect than orders granting such
retid, but the rule not to disturb trial
court's action except in ~Iear case of abuse
of discretion has not been relaxed. Code
Civ.Proc. § 473.
5. Appeal and error

~I008(3)

On appeal from order made on affidavits, involving the decision of a question
of fact, appellate court is bound by same
rule that controls it where oral testimony is
presented for review, and if there is any
conflict in affidavit, those in favor of prevailing party must be t~ken as true, and
fact stated therein must be considered to be
established.
6. Appeal and error

~948

On appeal from order denying motion
under statute to set aside default judgment,
burden of convincing that denial of motion was an abuse of discretion was on appellant. Code Civ.Proc. § 473.
7. Judgment «=>162(4)

Affidavits supporting and opposing individual defendant's motion to set aside default judgment 'under statute as taken
through mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or

